[user0000]

It is classical supply chain attack, and overheating the regular batteries did not happen at all.

[ANDAnd]

The September 17, 2024, cyber-physical attack on Hezbollah exemplified the rising sophistication of hybrid warfare, where traditional communication devices, like pagers, were exploited to cause significant destruction. In this operation, more than 3,000 pagers, ordered from Gold Apollo in Taiwan but manufactured under license by BAC Consulting in Hungary, were secretly modified to contain 10 to 20 grams of military-grade explosives, potentially PETN. These explosives were concealed alongside the lithium-ion batteries, with the modified pagers remaining functional but slightly heavier than their unaltered counterparts. The detonation was synchronized via a remote signal, possibly disguised as a routine communication, which triggered the explosives across multiple locations in Lebanon, resulting in at least nine fatalities and over 3,000 injuries. The operation was allegedly carried out by Israel's Mossad, demonstrating a deep infiltration of Hezbollah’s supply chain and communication infrastructure. Hezbollah’s choice of pagers, a low-tech alternative to mobile phones, aimed to avoid Israeli surveillance, but this reliance on simpler technology proved to be its vulnerability. Supply chain infiltration played a crucial role, with the pagers compromised before reaching Hezbollah operatives. Israel and Taiwan's improving relations, especially in the tech and digital domains, likely facilitated the operation's success, with Mossad exploiting supply chain weaknesses to insert explosives during manufacturing or transit. This operation highlighted how even low-tech devices can be weaponized, blurring the line between cyberattacks and physical sabotage. Historically, Israel has employed similar tactics, using mobile phones and now pagers as covert explosive devices, underscoring its strategic intelligence capabilities. The attack demonstrated the potential of signal-based detonation and raised concerns over the security of hardware supply chains, especially in conflict zones. It also sent a psychological message to Hezbollah, eroding their trust in communication methods and forcing them to reassess their security protocols. This incident underlines the critical importance of securing both software and hardware in modern warfare, as supply chain attacks increasingly become a powerful tool for state actors, enabling them to weaponize everyday communication tools with devastating consequences.

imprecinating attack, worthy of a movie, no doubt the Israeli intelligence service is one of the most feared and I ratify it with this attack, thanks for the information.

[sstmmltdwn]

Guys, think about this : it cannot be just 10-20g explosives, there has to be a way for these pagers to know when to blow up. Maybe some special chip inside each pager?

If one of these pages did not blowup, Lebanon can reverse engineer it. Theres going to be a lot of repercussions from this one incident.